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CON T EN TS.
I. STRIKES.-Definitions - Dependency of legality or illegality of strike upon object and means of accomplishing it.
II.

OBJECT of STRIKES. -

Strike to advance wages legal

to induce employer to re.tain or dismiss employe

legal - to better strikers' condition, legal -to induce workmen to join societies or unions, legal - to
injure anyone, illegal - malicious objedt, illegal.
III.

MEANS

of accomplishing the object.- Peaceable means,

as persuasion, argument etc., legal - violent means
as threats, intimidation, etc., illegal - boycotts,
illegal - picketing when peaceably conducted, legalriots and mob violence, illegal.
IV.

REMEDIES.Legal:-action for enticing away employes either with
or without contract

-actual

damages, must be shown-

injury, resulting in

mere wrongful act will not

create liability.
Equitable:-

remedy at law

Injunction granted when no adequate
-

to save multiplicity of actions -tem-

porary injunction granted

,

pending argumnent- mere

illegality
-actual

not sufficient

to warrant

an injunction

or threatened interference with property

necessary - peaceable combinations or strikes not
to be enjoined -

Courts of Equity have power to

punish for contempt, those who disobey their orders.

A strike is

largely a growth of the present century

There are accounts of strikes

in the past but as now

known , its growth has been so recent that one may almost
say within the last half century.
Two accounts of early strikes are found in

27 Am.

Law Review 708, one in 310 B.C. among the flute players
in

the Temple of Jupiter,

because they were not allowed
The other occurred

to hold their repasts in the Temple.
in

474 A. D.

for an Increase of wages.

the passage of an ordinanc+unishing

It

resulted in

the strikers.

The legal writers and the courts agree in the main
to define a strike as

"a

combination among laborers or
to compel an inFcrease of wag-

those employed by others*
a change in

es,

the hours of labor,

a change in

the man-

ner of conducting the business of the principal or to
enforce some particular policy in
"ber of men employed or the like.
tionary .
v

the character or numAnderson's Law Dic-

The definition is taken from D. & H. R.R.

Bowens, 58 N.Y.

Co.

Windfield's Adjudged Words and

573.

Phrases(1882) quotes the definition laid down in Farrer
v

Close,

"tion

4 Q. B. 612,"A strike is

a sinultaneous

of work on the part of the workmen"
1

cessa-

Black's Law Dictionary (1891),says, "A strike is
"the act of a body of workmen, employed by the same mas"ter, in stopping work altogether at a prearranged time
"and refusing to continue until higher wages or shorter
"hours or some other concession is granted to them by
"the employer."

Another definition

,

"The terr

is ap-

"plied cormmonly to a combined effort on the part of a
"body of workmen employed by the same master to enforce
"a demand for higher wages, shorter hours or some other
"concession by stopping work in a body at a prearranged
"time and refusing1h resume work until the demanded con"cession shall have been granted", is found in the Am.
Encyclopedia of Law

under "Strikes".

Bouvier's (1883) Law Dictionary says, "A strike is
"a combined effort by workmen to obtain higher wages or
"other coneessions from their employers, by stopping
"work at a prearranged time".

None of these appear to

include the sympathetic strike.
Certain elements are necessary to constitute a

strike and they are (1) a combination or agreement
(2) among workmen (3) to cease work simultaneously at a
(4) prearranged time

for the purpose of enforcing (5)

some demand made by the strikers of their (6) employers,
or in the case of a sympathetic strike
2

,

upon some other

person , upon whom their force is directly brought to
The strike does not occur until the employes have

bear.

actually ceased work.
But as to the legality or illegality of the strike.
In the Longshoremen's Assoc. v Howell, 38 Fac. Rep. 547,
And Mr.

it is said, "a strike is not illegal per se".
Justice Harlan in Arthur v

Oakes (C. C. A.)

310, said," A combination among

,

63 Fed. R

employes, having for

"their object the orderly withdraw&l in a body from the
tservice of their employer on account of a reduction of Xh
"their wages, is not,as a matter of law, within the mean"ing of that word as commonly used.

Such a withdrawal,

"though amounting to a strike, is not illegal". In Ray's
Contractual Limitations, after defining a strike the
author_

says, "Its

legality or illegality depends upon

"the means by which it is enforced or upoh its objects."
It

ceasevident from the above that the mere act of ]IBNxgg

is

ing work for a lggal purpose in a peaceable and lawful
manner, is, under the ordinary circumstances of a strike

legal.

But first,the l :gality depends upon the object

and second, upon the mode of effecting the object.
At Common Law, any combination of laborers, whether
for an increase of wages or any other object was illegal. It was irrebuttably presumed to b" done with a meal3

and hence a conspiracy.

icious intent

In the earliest

The Journeymen Tailors, 8

reported strike case, Rex v

Modern 10, decided in the early part of the 18th Century
the Court said, that whila. it was not an indictable offor the purpose of se8

fense for laborers to quit work

uring a increase in their wages, yet a conspiracy or
combination to do so was indictable.
an cases held the same rule

The early Americ-

among the first being

,

Commonwealth v Pullis which was tried in the Mayor's
Court of Philadelphialin 1806,and afterwards reported
in Wright's Law of Criminal Conspiracies.

The shoemakers

combined to compel .others to quit work to enforce an
increase in wages.

This was field to be an indictable of

fense.
Another Pennsylvania case
tried in

wainers Case,

1815,

,

The Pittsburg Cord-

held that a conspiracy to

coerce an employer, to prevent men from following their
trades or to compel them to join a society of workmen
was unlawful .

Cases,

36

,

in

Bright's Pa.

Commonwealth v Carlisle,

occurring in 1821,

a conviction was had on o.

an indictment for conspiracy to reduce the rate
of journeymen shoemakers.
"t ion is

The Court said,

"

of wages

A combina-

criminal whenever the act done or tobe dn

a

"a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to
oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the
4

"power of the confederates and giving the effect to the
"purpose of the latter, whether extortion

or mischief."

It was a serious matter to combine for any purpose
whatever in those times for the rights of the employer
were protected at the expense of the laborerswho were
but slowing emerging from the serfdom of the prec!ding
centuries.

But gradually the sky cleared and in England

by 6 Geo. IV, c. 129, an entire change was made.

All

statutes prohibiting agreements for the purpose of altering

wages, hours or other matters between employer and

employe, were enumerated'and absolutely repealed.

The

statute confined future,, prohibitions to'endeavors by
threats, force, intimidation

,

molestation or obstruction

Such

to affect wages or hours.

means were declared

concerning wages or hours was

illegal but an agreement

legal provided its means of enforcement did not violate
the above prohibition.

This statute has served as a mod-

el for statutes in many of the United States.
During the time preceding the passage of the statutes in the United States, the Courts

and legal writers

had leaned toward the 1Broader view as laid down in the
Statute of King George.

In the case of the People v

Melvin, 2 Wheeler's C. C. 262, the New York Court holds
that "a combination of journeymen which attempts by
threats and fines to coercNorkmen into a wtrikl

is a

"conspiracy "and as such, illegal. It also intimates that

5

had peaceable means been used ,itwould have been legal.
The case of the People v Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, is similar
to the above.

Finally in 1870, the State of New York

adopted the first of a series of laws , following the
model of that adopted by England in the reign of George
the Fourth.
The Courts had now arrived at the conclusion that
"the orderly and peaceable assembling or oo-operation
"of persons for obtaining an advance in wages apd for
"maintaining such a rate , is not conspiracy." Pe le v
Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 409.

Swe also

People v

Smith, 5 do.509. Cooley on Torts at p.229, says

"

It was

"shown ----that the conspiracy was not of itself a legal
"wrong.

It is a thing amiss when it has an unlawful

"purpose in view, but it does not become a legal wrong
"until the unlawfuilm purpose is accomplished or until
"some act distinctly illegal, is done toward its accom"plishment.

Nor is it perceived that the end

itself

"can be unlawful if it can be accomplished by perfectly
"lawful means."

See also Bigelow on Torts #75-79;

Clerk

and Lindsall on Torts, p 16; Brientenberger v Schmidt,
38 Ill. Ap.168.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary

says, "When this (meaning

"ing the strike) is peaceably effected without any pos"itive breach of contract, it is not un lawful."And Chief
Justice Beardsley,

of the New Jersey Court of Appealssaid

6.

in

State v Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151,"nor is there any

"more doubt that though the purpose

the confederacy is

"designed to accomplish be not criminal, yet if the means
"be of an indictable character,
"is

this offense(conspiracy)

likewise committed."
So a strike may be lawful if

its objects are lawful

and the means by which the object is to be accomplished
are also lawful.

This raises the two distinct and pera lawful object of a strike.

tinent questions: What is

and What are lawful means of accomplishing
when lawfnl,

for if

either be illegal,

this object

the whole is

tainted.
Andfirst, what is a lawful object? Perhaps the
best method of determining this question is to ascertain
what is not lawful as an object.

The common idea attach-

ing itself to the thought of a strike is
endeavor
employer

that it is an

on the part of the strikers to dictate to the
.

The wage question is a frequent cause of a

strike and the- object is to secur an advance. The first
AaeriCan case, Commonwealth v Pullis, cited above,
was
founded on a strike in the city of Philadelphia for an
increase of wages and the Court held that "a combination
"to compel other shoemakers to quit work to enforce an
"increase in wages is

an indictable offence

unlawful .
7

"

and so

A Massachussc tts case, Commonwealth v Hunt, Thatcher
Criminal Cases 609, was of- similar origen and was decided upon the

same doctrine, see also People v Fisher ,sup-

ra.
The English cases of that time of which Reg. v
Duffield, 5 Dox Crim. Cases 404, is a type, held that
"workmen had not the right to conspire to compel an in"crease of wages

by abandoning the service of their

"master or inducing others to do so."
Druitt, 10 Cox Crim. Cases 593.

The

See also Reg. v
dases of that time

all held that a strike or combinationo accomplish an
increase of wages

was an indictable offense.

But the change was soon effected.

In the English

case of Reg. v Rowlands, 17 Adol. and Ellis(N. S.) .671,
the Court in charging the jury said, "The law is clear
"that workmen have a right to combine to obtain
"es as theychoose to agree to demand.

such wag-

As far as I know

"there is no objection in point of law to it."

On appeal,

the highest court of England said that the charge
correct.

Lord Campbell ,C. J.,

was

said, in Hilton v Eckers-

ley, 24 L. J. 353 at p. 359, "I cannot bring myself to
"believe--.--- that if two workmen who sincerely believe
"

their wages to be itadequate, shall meet

and agree

"that they will not work unless their wages are

raised,

"without designing or contemplating violence or any il"legal means of gaining their object, they would be guilty
8

"of a misdemeanor and liable to punishment.

-

-

-The ob-

"ject is not illegal and therefore if no illegal means
"are to be used, there is no indictable conspiracy."

The

latest English case on this subject is the Mogul Steam
ship company v McGregor, 15 Q. B. D. 477,in which Chief
Justice Coleridge lays down the rule at present applicable in England, thus, "A combination of workmen to ob"tain better wages is lawful so long as their object and
"purpose are not to injure another."
The case of the Master Stevedors' Association v
I

Walsh, 2 Daly 1, which holds that

"

an agreement among

"workingmeti that they will not themselves work for less
"than

a stipulated price, confined in its operation to

"those who have agreed to it

,

is not contrary to the

"law", is typical of the later American decisions. See
Thomas v the Protective Musical Association, 121 N. Y.45
Old Dominion Steamship Co. v McKenna, 18 Abb,( N. C.) 262
and

People v Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 429; Perkins v

Rogg, 28 Weekly Law Bulletin, 32; and the People v Wilzig
supra.
The proposition or rule to be deduced is that

,

a

combination orf strike among workmen for the purpose of
effect ing an in--hrease in their wages is legal when those
combining honestly believe the desired increase to be
just and it is not to injure some one else and when the
9

In

meanq of accomplishing this object are legal means.

other words, the courts do not look upon such a combination as dictating to an employer.

He is

left free by

such a strike to do as he pleases in regard to their
demand
Now, those cases in which the object involves the
employment or discharge of workmeng involving the right
of the employer to employ whom he may choose

.

The cases

upon this are all to be found within the last fifty years
One of the first, cases bearing on this point is Rex V
Ferguson and Edge, 2 Starkie Reports 489.

The defendants

were charged with combining to leave their employment in
order to prevent their employer from taking apprentices.
There

was a conviction and the case was appealed.

though the appeal was decided

Al-

on points of evidence) the

Court of King's Bench expressed no doubt as to the illeg4
Rex v Rickerdyke, 1 M. & Rob.

al nature of the offense.
179 was a colliery case.

Laborers threatened to strike

unless certain objectionable men were discharged. Mr.
Justice Patterson held that the workmen had no~'ight to
meet and oombine for the purpose of dictating
master whom he should employ

to the

and that such an act was

illegal.

This decision was directly in point .

there is

the case of the Springhead Spinning Co.
10

Then
v Riley

holding that"every many
"being employed

-

-

had the liberty of employing or

and every man must respect the like

"liberty in others,
was held in People v Smith,

It

in the People
292

ex rel.

supra,

and affirmed

Gill v Walsy, 6 N. Y.

Crim. Rep.

110 N. Y. 633, that combining to procure employers

,

to discharg specified workmen because of their refusal to
join labor organizations of the accused, is a criminal
offense.

The Supreme Court of Mlassachussetts in the

well known strike case of Walker v Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
said that the employer while he has no right to protection from competition has a right of being free from

mal-

icious or wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance.
And Mr. Justice Beasley, in the New Jersey case,

State v

Donaldson, cited above, says , "It is not to be denied
"that the alleged aim (to secure the discharge of some
"workmen) of this combination was unlawful.

The, effort

"was to dictate to this employer, whom he should discharge
"from his employment.

I cannot regard such a course of

"conduct as lawful1."
It
59 Vt.

was adjudged in the case of the State v Stewart,
273,

that an unlawful combination to prevent,

by

violence and intimidation a certain company from retaiming and taking into its employment certain workmen is an
indic:-table offense.

Mr. Cooley in his book on the Law of Torts says:"A
"society of men may lawfully unite in agreeing that they
"will not perform services for thosewho employ laborers
"not associated with them. 3ut they become wrong-doers
"the moment they interfere with the liberty of others".
He cites Carew v Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 in support of
this, also the case of the Old Dominion Steamship Company v McKennacited above.
In these early cases, the doctrine that 'combinations
for the purpose of dictating to an employer, were unlawful' was unqualifiedly laid down by the court. But as
the cases progressed that doctrine was modified so that
in instances where there was no compulsion by any means,
a strike or combination for the purpose of inducing an
employer to change his employes is not unlawful in itself.
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his Law of Torts, page 295, says:
"It would seem to follow from the principles of the mod"ern cases that it cannot be an actionable conspiracy for
"two or more persons by lawfuil means, to induce another
or others to do or abstain from doing what they are not
"bound to do by law"
Another object which has been held lawful is the
betterment of the laborer's trade or condition.
Gibson in

Judge

the early case of Commonwealth v Carlisle,

above, says: "A combination to resist oppression, not
12

cited

"merely supposed but real,

would be perfectly innocent."

Among the last cases upon this is Reynolds v Everts
reported finally in 144 N. Y. 189. But in the opinion at
Special Term, Justice Smith states the present situation
thus, "Irrespectivof any statuite, I think the law now
"permitvorkmen at least within a limited territory, to
"combine together and by peaceable means to seek any legl
"timate advantage in their trade."

See People v Kostka,

supra; In re Wabash, 24 Fed. Rep. 217; L. Linheamer v the
United Garment Workers' Association, 77,1HUn 215, upon
this topic.
But does 'any legitimate advantage' include combinations to compel workmen to join a particular society or
union, or to prevent them from following their trade or
calling?

In the Pittsburg Cordwainers' case it was held

that a conspiracy to prevent men from following their
trade or to compel them to join a society of workmen, was
unlawful.

The same doctrine is held in the People v Kostka.

Again in the Old Dominion Steamship Company v McKenna it

was held that "all combinations or associations designed
"to coerce workmen to become mJembers of such combinations
"or to interfere with, obstruct, etc, them in working ,etc
-

are pro tanta illegal combinations and associations"

Connor v Kent(1891) L. R. 2 Q. B. 545, is an English case
13

holding the same doctrine.

But a recent Indiana case,

Clemitt v Watson, 42 N.E. Rep.367, holds that "a combin"a tion among the defendants to quit work unless the Plain"tiff was discharged, by reason of which he was thrown
"out of employment; or an agreement not to work with the
"Plaintiff
temployer

,

persuant to wlich they quit work, because the

refused to discharge him, by reason of which

"the business was suspended and the Plaintiff was thrown
"out of work, is not actionable in the absence of malice."
The early cases hold that combinations or strikes
for the purpose of causing workmen to join a society or
to prevent them from working at their trade,wwre illegal
no matter

how the object might be accomplished.

But in

the wage questionthe Courts have come to the conclusion
that if the means used to accomplish the object are legal,
the object itself is not unlawful.

Thus it had been seen

that workmen may combine and strike for the purpose of
procuring an advance in thrate of wages, or to better
their condition in any way; they may leave their work un-

til a certaiti party is discharged or to induce certain
workme~n to join certain societies or unions, provided
always that the means used to accomplish such objects
are not of themselves unlawfutl.

14

But they may not strike maliciously for the purpose
of injuring their employer or any other person for such
a combination or striie would have for its object the viol
ation of some other persons rights and liberties which
in the United States are reserved to them by the Constitutional provisions.
Now, what are the lawful means?
if traced in their growth wil
mined .

The common methods

be found judicially deter-

within the last half century.

It was held in

Reg. v Duffield, supra, that "workmen had not the right
"to compel---------.by abandoning the service of their
"master or by inducing others to quit."

That case illuslaw
first,
theAat
rights
employers
of
the
trates how careful
was.

The case of Reg. v.

Druitt coming a few years lat-

er laid down a somewhat less severe rule, that "combina"tions of men to coerce that liberty by compulsion and
"restraint is a criminal offense."
Turning to the Amnerican cases, the Master Stevedors'
Association v

alsli, decided in 1867, that a strike to

raise wages, which is legal in itself, "ai

are

"into effect by threats or acts of violence, amount to a
"criminal conspiracy."

Two years later in the State v

Donaldson, it was held that where a body of workmen informed their employer that they would leave his factory
15

if a certain workman is not dismissed,

"

coercion is there

"in that they agree to leave simultaneously in large
"numbers and by a preconcerted action.

It is equivalent

"to a threat thatlunless he yields to their unjust demands
"they will derange his busiess."

Here the

mere act of

quitting their employment in a body, is considered a coercion.
Mr.

Justice Brewer,

in delivering an oral opinion

in the United States v Kane, 23 Fed. Rep. 748, said,"The
"employes

am-..

may abandon the employment and by per-

suasion and argument induce oter employes to do the same;
"but if they resort to threats or violence to induce the
"others to leave or accomplish the'tr purpose without ac"tual violence by overawing the others by preconcerted
"demonstrations of" force
"their

unlawful acts."

of the striker to use
other strikers to leav,

-

-

-

they may be punished for

Herefor the first.,is the right
argument and persuasion to induce
recognized.

But again in the

former case threats violen6*e or even intimidation
expressly prohibited and in the lat~sr,
is

implied.

are

the prohibition

Even demonstrations of force for the purpose

of intimidation may not be used.
In

1887,

the Old Dominion Steamship Company v McKenna

is authoritylifor the statement that all combinations
16

designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combination or to interfere with, obstruct etc. them in working etc., to prevent employers from conducting thor business , or to interfere with the perfect freedom of the
employers etc., by threats or injury or loss, by interfering with their-.business etc., are illegal combinations
and all acts done in furtherance of such intention by
by such means and accompanied by damages are actionable.
Again "while the law permits striking workmen to
"persuade and induce other workmen to cease labor and
join the strikers in their demand for higher wages, such
"strikers have no right to interfere by threats

,

intimid-

"ation or coercion with the free will of such other work
"man." Perkins v Rogg, supra.

Cooley on Torts at p.331

says, "Acts done in persuance of a conspiracy may be un"lawfulin themselves if they include deception, intimida"tion , threats or any species of duress whatever when
"employed upon laborer or employer."
The last great strike cas decided in New York state

was Reynolds v Everts and in the opinion at Special Term
17 N. Y. Sup. 264, Justice Smith~after recognizing the
illegality of the interference of strikers by threats, intimidation or coercion of any kind with the free will of
the workmen and) also, recognizing
17

the right to strike for

certain objects, says,"The right to combine involves of

"necessity the right to persuade all
"the combination.

o-laborers to join

This right to persuade co-laborers in-

"volves the right to persuade new laborers to join the
"combination.

This is but a corollary of the right -of

"combihation.

Butwhenever the strikers assume towardhe

"employes~an attitude of menace, then persuasion and en"treaty with wordsowever smooth

,

may constitutet-intimid-

"ation which will render thos--e who use them liable to
"the penalties both of civil and criminal law."
Thus, in the beginning of the. law of strikes, a strike
or combination was illegal, indictable under any circumnstances.

But Igradually the courts sifted the cases, plac-

ing those conducted by persuasion and argument within the
pale of the law nd leaving those conducted by threats,
violence, intimidation and coercion outside,.

But this

was not reached all in a moment or without a dissenting
voice.

At least one case is cited above-in which it was

held that, "leaving the employment in a body"
self intinmidation and coercion.
but that o~the minority

was in it

This view~ however 1 as >)

and to-day a quiet, orderly strike

whose members use only persuasion, argument and other
peaceable means to attain their object, is perfectly legal
and may be carried on with impunity, so long as their ob18

ject is itself legal.
But now arises the question as to what constitutes
intimidation or coercion.

There are certain acts which

frequently, if not always,accompany strikes.
boycotts, picketing

They are

and riots or mob violence.

The very idea of a boycotti.e.to prevent a person
from carrying on his business, is illegal for on the face
,it is the intention to injure the person against whom
it is declared.

It is a threat carried into execution.

a threat to ruin, A's businessunless he concedes to the
demands made upon him and "a threat must be an intimida"tion made with the intention of forcing and unduly influen"cing the person's conduct against whom it is addressed."
Wood v Bowron, L. R. 2 Q.B.

21.

And it was held that the

sending of notices of a strike to be continued until the
dismissal of a non-union vran, was the sending of threats
and so illegal.

Skinner v Kitch, L.R.,

Springhead Spinning Co.

v

Riley,

6 Eq.

2 Q.B. 393. also
Cases 851.

In an attempt to extort mosey from a party by means
of a boycott.,it was held that intimidation did not necessarily require physical violence.
and numberi of the strikers,

But that the attitude

placards or other devices

used~migh~t constitute intimidation.
19

People v Wilzig supua.

Thisi- case intimates that the boycott itself would constitute intimidation and thus be illegal.
A distinction between

a strike and a boycott Is drawn

in Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan R.R. v the Pennsylvania R.R., 54 Fed. Rep. at p. 738, where it was held
that "the one combination was lawful because it was for the
"lawful purpose of selling the labor of those engaged in it
"for the highest price attainable End for the best terms.
"What the employes threatened to do,,was to

deprive the

"defendant companies of the benefit accruing from their
"labor in order to induce, procure and compel the companies
"and their managing officers to consent to a criminalnd
"unlawful injury to the complainant.

Neither law nor morals

"can give this right to the laborer or withhold it

from

See also Sherry v Perkins

"the others forv.such a purpose."

So the boycott is of itself illegal and

147 Mass. 212.

as such may not be used as a means of attaining the object
of the strike.
"Picketing is another mode of intimidation resorted to

"at times and it
"organization

consists of posting rilerbers of the strikers

at the approaches to the works of the em

"ployer who thereupoh attempt to warn off the workmen by
fpersuasion or intimidaton.

Ti

a

rnyntb

"lawful accordin~to the degree of intimidation used.
20

n

If

"persuasion alone is resorted to there is no breach of
"of the law."

American Encyclopedia of Law V 24, p 132.

In Reg. v Druitt,

it was held that mere picketing

if so done as not to excite unreasonable alarm, or as not
to coerce or annoy, was no offense in the law.

But if

pickets indulged in abusive language or alarming gestures,
to becomes at once illegal.

Other English cases holding

the same doctrine are Reg. v Shcpherd, 11 Cox Crim. C.325;
Reg. v Duffield, supra; Reg. Bauld, 13 Cox Crim, C. 282.
In the United States, the Courts have differed considerably over the legality of picketing.

The early cases

of People v Kostka, supra; People v Wilzig, do., Crump v
Commonwealth, 85 Va. 927; and Brace v Evans, 3 Ry. and
Corp. Law Journal held it unlawful.
rule has from tim

But this sweeping

to time been modified until it was laid

down by Mr. Justice Smith in Reynolds v Everts at Special
Term and not contradicted by the upper Courts when appealed
that so long a--s pickets were peaceablelin bearing and language toward the employes, and their numbers were not suf-

ficient to be an intimidation, picketing is lawful. But
the moment that force, violence etc., are introduced, it
eases to be lawful.

See also United States v Kane, supra;

Perkins V Rogg, supra; Richter v the Journeymen Tailors,
24 Weekly Law Bulletin,189.
21

But in carrying out this picket duty, "No man has a
"right to enter the premisis of another for the purpose
"of inducing persons in the employment of that person to
v Barry, 38 N.W. Rep.289.

Webber

"leave their employment."

They mayhoweve offer money to pay the return fare or the
II

expenses of those who have taken
ducement

their places, as an inReynolds v Everts,

to them to join thelstrik:e.

supra.
The last of the accompaniments

of the strike is

the

riot or mob violence, which is defined as, "Where thre~or
"more persons actually do an unlawful actIof violence with
"or without common cause." 4 Bi. Com. 146.

The same defin-

ition is laid down in the case of Whitley v the State, 66
Ga. 656.'

Another definition is "a tumultuous disturbance

"of the peace by three or more persons assembling together
"of their own authoritIith an intent, mutually to assist
"the other against any one who shall oppose them in the
"execution of some enterprise of a private nature

and af-

"terwards actually executing the same in a violent and

"turbulent manner,

whether the act itself was illega1or

"not when intended."
Th

-

State v Russell,

45 N. H. 84.

definitions show at once the unlawful character

of the acts and it

is

apparently needless to cite casos

upon this point.
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From the foregoing pages it will be seen that workmen
may combine and even strike for the purpose of bettering
their condition in any way.

They may do so to obtain an

advance in their wages or if a co-employe is objection
able and the employer refuses to discharge him,

they may

agree to and actually quit their employment until such
objectionable person is discharged.

In short the cases

now tend to hold that workmen may combine and strike dor
any object, so long as that object is not to injure some
other person and the strike is not accompanied by 4ialice.
It has also been shown that peaceable means such as
argument, persuasion and entreaty are legitimate methods
of accomplishing the desired ends;

but that threats or

intimidationthough no actual violence has been used, is
considered a means of unlawful coercion, as bad ih the ey-of the law as actual force or violence;

that picketing

as a means of carrying on a strike may be lawful so long
as the demeanor of the picket is
pickets are not in

such numbers as to awe the emPloyelor

employesnto acquiescing;
unlawful in

quit and peaceable and the

that boycotts and riots are

thernselves.
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And it now remains to learn what remedies the employers
have, if any
them.

,

against the strikers and the development of

These remedies are of two kinds, legal and equitable

and will be considered in that order.
The remedy at law isof course)in damages.

In Bige-

law on Torts it is laid down tiiat, "when conspiracy is
"made the ground of a civil action, it must have caused
"damages".

So it is plain that th mere strike without

damages,offers the employer or the person against whom it
was directed no remedyiiat law.

The majority of actions at

law which are the outcome of strikes, have been founded
upon the enticing or driving away of servants or upon
injury.) resulting from

interference with employes or the

general business.
One of the English cases decided on this remedy is
Hart v Aldridge, ICowper 54, in 1774.

It was an action

for trespass for enticing away some of the plaintiff's
servants, who were employed to work by the piece.

The

Court said here, "It is clear that a master may maintain

"an action for taking and enticing away his servants."
Again where the facts were similar, the court held that

the act of enticing awe y workmen, c ven though not working
24

under contract, constituted conspiracy and the defendant
Guntor v Astor, 4

was liable in damages for such act.

Moore(Eng.) 12; Reg. v Rowlands, supra.

The Court of the

Queen's Bench, in Bowen v Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, sustained
this doctrine of Luinley v Gye,

22 L.

J.( Q. D.)

463,

hold-

ing that it was actionable to induce a party to break his
contract

of service with the plaintiff.

The Mogul. Steamship Co.
is

v McGregor,

23 Q. B.

another and a later case upon this subj-ct.

D.

600

Lord Esher

in his opinion said, "When an indictable conspiracy is
"carried into execution by the conspirators by means of an
"unlawftld act or acts, which produce private injury to some
"person, that person has a cause of action against the
"conspirators."

Here is found the broad rule that conspir-

ators or strikers, whoby means of unlawful actscause injury with damage to some person, are liable to such person
for such damages.

Any act of the strikers which causes

damage, will be a sufficient ground

or an action by the

damaged party.
The last of the series of leading English cases @n

this practica93affirmed

the rule just citedfand specific-

ally affirmed the liability for enticing away of servants
whether under contract or not.
25

It

further said that the

"right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of con"tract is nOt confined to contracts in the nature of conTempleton v Russell,

"tracts for personal service.

(C.A.

1893) 1 Q. B. 71b.
But to return to the doctrine in the United States.
The early American cases were of a criminal natursand it
was not until the middle of this century that civil actn
ions were made use of against strihers.

In Curran v Galen,

22 N.Y. Sup. 826, it was held that a complaint which charged
the defendant,who fepresented certain labor organizations,
with conspiracies to injure the plaintiff, in his business
and character

and to prevent his obtaining employment, etc

stated a good cause of action.
A Georgia

Court held that when parties knowing of

the existence of a contract of labor, entices, hires or
persuade.the laborer so contracted to leave the employment
of his first employer during the time for which he is so
employed, the law gives the party .so injured a right of
action to recover danages.

Jones v Blocker 43 Ga. 331;

Also Salter v Howard, do. 601.

It will alamo be seen that

this case narrows the rule of liability for enticing away
servants

to cases where the person so enticing, knows of

the contract.

In the same year, the Supreme Judicial

Court of Ivassachussetts, in Cronin v Walker, supra.,iaid
26.

down the samie rule as that by the Georgia Court and said
further,that,"the damage from which the, recovery is had
"is

not loss of value of actual contract by reason of

"their non-fulfillment but the loss of advantage , which
"but for such interference, the plaintiff would have been
"able to acquire."
The case of Haskins v Royster,

70 N.

C. 601,

holds

the sa,_ e rule concerning the enticing away of servants.
However this court did not insist, as in 107 Mass., upon
allegatidn and proof of actual loss occasioned by such act.
The mere act of enticing away the servants ,was sufficient
to render the liability.

Bixby v Dunlop, 56 N. H.

456,

though not a strike case, cites the above and holds with
Haskins v Royster.

While some of the cases cited above

are against single individuals for enticing away servants,
they apply as wdll where the enticing is by the strikers.
And now the mere enticing away of servants or employes
without allegation and proof of actual damage,

will not

constitute a cause of action.
The great case of this period was the Old Dominion
Steamship Company v MoKenna,
that all

acts done in

supra,

in

which it

was held

furtherance of such"intention4.e.

"to coerce employes to join societies,,

inte! ferQ

with

"business etc., and accompanied by damage are actionable."
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Here again damagc is made the essential element of the
actionability of an act.

"The gist of such an action must

"not be in the combination or conspiracy but in the actual
"loss occasioned thereby."

Toeldo, Anr

Michigan R. R. v Pennsylvania R.R.

Arbor and Northern

There the Court

tersely puts the rule which Mr. Bishop, in his work on
Non-Contract Law, lays down thus, "The rule in civil juris"prudence is that one cannot maintain a suit for another's

"wrongs, until he bas been injured thereby ---. No wrong"ful combination is actionable until the party complain"ing has suffered darage.

In an action at law 'therefere he

"material thing is to show an injury."

That is a statement

of the rule as it is today.
But the remedies most sought against the strikers are
those afforded by Equity.

And

, first, the interlocutory

or temporary injunction. When an application is made to,the Court for an injunction, if it is shown that the injury
will accrue to the applicant before the argument

can be

made for the permanent injunction, the Courts will grant
what is known as a temporary injunction, pending the the
disposition of a motion ~fr a permanent injunction.
is granted upon affidavits and is seldoni refused.

This
See High

on Injunct ions.
It

is

a rule of Equity that its

courts will not

inter-

fere when there is a complete and adequate remedy at law.
28

Or where there is

no imminent danger or irreparable mis-

chief before the tardiness of the law can reach it.

City

of Georgetown v Alex. Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91; Mogul Steam
ship Co. v McGregor, supra.In Blendell Bros. v Hogan, 54
Fed. Rep. 40,
Fe tal

the Court held that the jurisdiction oqthe

Circuit court to entertain a suit t6 enjoin a com-

bination of persons from interfering with or preventing
ship owners

from shipping a crew may be maintained on

the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of actions and because damages at commo)
to ascertain.

law would be inadequate and hard

Where ,"the injury will

e irreparable

"and a judgment at Law will be wholly inadequate, the authit

orities leave no doubt that in such a case, an injunction
i

will be granted against a stranger who thus intermeddles
"and harrqsses the complainant's business." T. A.A. & N.M
R.R. v Pa. R.R.,

supra;Sherry v Perkins, do.; Springhead

Spinning Co. v Riley, do.; Casey v Typographical Union,
45 Fed. Rep. 135.
But the mere fact ti-at the act or acts sought to be

enjoined are illegal will not be sufficient ground for a
court of Equity to interfere.

"Something more than the

"threatened cofluission of ai~ffense against the laws of
"the land is

necessary to call into exercise the injunc
29

-

"tive powers of the Court.
"%ctual or threatened with

There must be some interference
property or rights of a pec-

ii

"uniary nature.

United States v Debs, 158 U. S. at 593.

Arthur v Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 10; C. B. & Q.

v B. C.R. & N

34 Fed. Rep. 481; Sherry v perkins, :;upra.

Nor is this

injunction destroyed because the act enjoined are violations

U. S.

of the criminal law.
rell

128 N. Y.

v Debs.

341; Mobile v L.

do.

& N.

Cranford v Tyr-

R.R.

84 Ala.

115.

However, "wheAthere is a willful and -nlawful invasion
"of the plaintiff's rights, against his protest and re"monstrance, the injury being a continuing one, a manda"tory injunction may issue in
on Injunctions,
court,

instance." High

An injury must be shown to the

-2.

recrring

the first

and without remedy at law,

before an

injunction will be granted.
But the Court in Reynolds v Everts refused to make
permanent an interlocutory injunction, "to- restrain handi-w
"craftsmen from combining peaceably and without intimida"tion,

Persuadinithoir

fellow workmen to leave the ser-

"vice of their employer in order to compel an advance in
"wages'.'

Prac.

See also Johnson Harvester Co.

168;

47 N. J.

Eq.

v Meinhardt,

lMaher v Journeymen Stone cutters'
519.

60 How.

Association

And when Reynolds v Everts was carried
30

to the Court of Appeals, (144 ".Y.

l8c+),

Judge Gray

said

"the mere apprehension of some future acts of a wrongful
"nature, which might be injurious to the plaintiff, was
"not a sufficient basis for insisting uppon a preventative
"injunction.

Such a remedy becomes a necessity only when

"it is perfectly clear upon the facts, that unless granted
"the comiplainant will;, be irreparably injured and that he
"can have no adequate remiedy at law for the mischief

oc-

"casioned."
But the acts sought to be enjoined in the case cited
above were peaceable and for a lawful object.

Where per-

sons attempt by threats and other unlawful means

,

to carry

out an unlawful object, the State of IL[issouri, by its
highest court enjoined them.

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v

Saxey, 32 S'W. Rep. 1106.
And, finallyIit is seen that Equity is the last resort of the injured party when law cannot redress his
wrongs or where it will be a great burden for him to adopt
the legal remedy, because of the difficulty in ascertain-

ing the damages

or because of the multiplicity of actions

which must result from such

mode of redress.

Thth

Court of Equity, upon sufficient affidavits will grant a
preliminary injunction, pending the hearing of the applieAtion for a permanent injunction, is well known . But then
31

comes the question as to when the temporary
be made permanent.

injunction will

The cases hold the doctrine that Equity

will not interfere with the peaceable
Nor will it,1interfere
ers are unlawful.

sim,]ply because

acts of strikers.
the acts of the strik-

The acts must threaten or actually

in-

terfere with some pecuniary interest of the party , so
that injury is

certain or imminent and such injury must be

beyond the remedy of the law in
remedy must be inadequate.

any way,

or else the legal

But when these conditions have

beenAftulfilled, Equity is ready to stretch forth her protecting arm.
And should those against whom the injunction is directed, neglect to obey it,

they become guilty of contempt and

liable to punishment by the Court.
in

the United States v Debs,

Mr. Justice Brewer,

says " But the power of the

"Court to make an order carries with it , the equal power
"to punish for the disobedience of that order and the in"quiry as to the question of disobedience,
"time immemorial

,

the special function of the Court."

Case of Yates,
bliss.
son,

4 Johns.

331; Cartwright's case,
7 Cranch 32;

parte Robinson,

has been from

314; Watson,
114 Mass.

Anderson v Dunn,

19 Wal.

v Willia2]s,

230; U.

6 VWheateon;

505; Mugler v Kansas,

Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co.
32.

134 U.S. 31;

S.

33

v HIud-

204; Ex
123 U.S.

623;

In

brief,

a court nnforcing obedience to its

ders by proceedings

contempt is

in

own or-

not executing the crima-

inal laws of thn

land but only securing to suitors the

rights to which,

it

has adjudged them entitled.

And so the Law of strikes,
the strilers

relating to the rights of

and the remedies of their employers,

have been

brought down to the present time, the purpose of the thesis
be ing to trace out why the law is
in the course of time.
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as it

is

but How itlcame%1
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